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ABSTRACT 
Marketization has been so liberally applied to understanding higher 
education finance policy change that it has become a less potent concep-
tual tool. Through its evolution as a conceptual tool, the relationship 
between state control and market control has become an either/or propo-
sition. In Ontario, state control over higher education has been strength-
ened with the use of market mechanisms, particularly as they have been 
utilized in resource allocation. This article outlines seven major higher 
education policy changes that make use of market mechanisms while 
enhancing state control. It is argued that marketization is a compromise 
between privatization, academic autonomy, and blatant state control in 
the face of the backlash against government intrusion in western socio-
economic life. 
RÉSUMÉ 
La mise en marché en éducation, ou l 'emploi des mécanismes du 
marché, a été appliquée si libéralement pour comprendre les décisions 
f i n a n c i è r e s en éduca t ion q u ' e l l e s ' e s t r endue inut i le p o u r déc r i r e 
l 'évolution ou les changements de la politique actuelle. En plus, elle a 
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évolué d 'une telle façon que le rapport entre le contrôle de l 'État et celui 
du marché est devenu une proposition de l 'un ou l 'autre. En Ontario, le 
c o n t r ô l e de l ' É t a t en é d u c a t i o n a é té r e n f o r c é a v e c l ' e m p l o i des 
mécan i smes du marché , surtout dans le domaine de l 'a l locat ion des 
ressources. Ce document brosse un tableau sur les sept changements les 
p lus impor t an t s qui ont u t i l i sé les m é c a n i s m e s du m a r c h é tou t en 
améliorant le contrôle de l 'État. On discute la mise en marché comme un 
compromis entre la privatisation, l ' autonomie scolaire, et l 'étatisation 
devant les répercussions contre l 'imposition gouvernementale dans la vie 
socioéconomique de l 'Occident. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1974, Larry L. Leslie and Gary P. Johnson wrote of policy change 
at the federal level in the United States that involved the redirection of 
federal funds away from universities' operating support to student aid. 
The authors argue that those changes served to unleash market dynamics 
in the public higher education sector, measures taken in part to assist the 
financially ailing private institutions: By introducing greater choice for 
the student cum customer through an increase in portable subsidies, the 
troubled private institutions had a greater chance of survival. This, fol-
lowing the market paradigm, would ensure choice and competition in the 
higher education market, composed of both public and private sectors. 
Today the notion of market izat ion is applied to a host of policy 
changes which ostensibly seek to make institutions more accountable to 
their truly vast array of stakeholders: students, employers and the tax-
paying public at large, as well as introducing decentralization and the 
need for an increase in competition for both public and private funds. 
Howeve r , in s o m e c a m p s marke t i za t ion has b e c o m e a ca tch-a l l to 
describe reform in a variety of jurisdictions in which universities, still 
largely state-dependent, are undergoing what are fundamentally minor 
c h a n g e s in regu la t ion . For e x a m p l e , the concep t has been used to 
describe recent policy directions in Spain, where universities are realiz-
ing some measure of badly needed autonomy from the central state, by 
delegating to the institutions the power to set curricula, hire faculty and 
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respond to the consumer needs of students (Mora, 1997). The reforms 
were in par t a r e sponse to the Franco r e g i m e ' s use of un ivers i t ies 
through a good part of the last century as political tools, which placed 
these institutions in a position of complete dependence upon the state 
(p. 188). After the restoration of democracy in 1978, reform of the rela-
tions between the state and universities was regarded as a priority on the 
part of both academics and government. In 1983, the Ley de reforma 
universitaria [Univers i ty Refo rm Act] granted Spanish univers i t ies 
autonomous status, rendering them accountable to Spain's autonomous 
regional authorities in place of the central government. However, with 
the continued role of the regional state in regulating, controlling and 
financing the system, 'marketization' has been hastily applied to a sys-
tem that is merely removing some of the instruments that had allowed 
the former dictator to take such as firm grasp of the nation's universities. 
More fatal to the integrity of the notion of marketization as a mean-
ingful analytical tool in understanding higher education reform is the 
'ei ther/or ' proposition upon which it often rests. Observations of global 
trends in higher education at t imes fail to capture the multi-layered and 
sometimes seemingly contradictory nature of policy change. For exam-
ple, the fatal f law of such works as Goedegebuure et al. 's (1993) review 
of higher education policy change in western Europe is this either/or 
proposition. In noting the general direction of changes in the relationship 
between academic autonomy, the market and the state, the authors note: 
If the push towards institutional competition, de-regulation, 
and privatization is a pervasive and long-term trend, then it is 
an interesting phenomenon indeed, for it appears to represent 
a reversal of governments ' attitudes in their relationship with 
higher education. Trow. . . notes that during the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s most Western governments were not wil l ing to 
trust to the pr ivate sector the ach ievement of basic social 
goals . . . (p. 324) 
Is market izat ion a long-term and long-last ing shif t in university 
finance policy? That is, of course, unknown. It may even prove to be as 
short-lived as the block grant. However, the problem with the question is 
that it is perhaps the least important one, for it fails to take account of 
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how markets and governments work in tandem, and, further, how the 
marke t pa rad igm s imply adds yet another ins t rument to the s ta te ' s 
already formidable tool box that assists it in regulating and controlling 
higher education. In other words, the introduction of market mechanisms 
does not exclude an increase in government control, but rather a change 
in the nature of the inducements the state may offer to 'encourage ' uni-
versities to adopt government identified priorities and activities. It is 
suggested, then, that there may in fact be no reversal of government atti-
tudes per se, but that governments have simply 'discovered' a new way 
of organizing reform and control. 
An examination of policy change in several jurisdictions, particu-
larly in the Commonwealth countries, demonstrates that more is going 
on than simply a matter of governments renouncing control over univer-
sities to the market. Though in decades past it may have been true that 
the achievement of social goals was not assigned to the private sector, 
today many western governments are far too interested in the role uni-
versities can play in economic growth to allow them to reside entirely 
outside their grasp. The competitive edge universities provide to national 
and regional economic centres by producing a highly educated and 
trained labour force — not the mention their role as knowledge produc-
ers — is far too valuable to government and their economic growth 
strategies, even to those governments bent on cost-cutting. 
Thus marketization represents a neo-Liberal, late-20th century com-
promise be tween pr iva t iza t ion , the ' a u t o n o m o u s ' univers i ty that is 
removed from all social and economic forces, and blatant government 
control in the face of the backlash against state intrusion in western socio-
economic life. For their part, market mechanisms are viewed by govern-
ments as a way of assisting them in allocating resources, where either 
government failure or market failure threaten either efficient allocation, 
or in the latter case, a resultant loss of state control over outcomes. 
THE MARKET DEFINED 
Market relations and market exchange, simply defined, involve two 
parties which voluntarily contract to exchange a good or service for a 
socially or legally recognized currency. According to many of its learned 
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and most articulate spokespeople, it is in this simplicity that its merits 
are most strongly evident. Markets are expressions of a "spontaneous 
order," and are an outgrowth of evolutionary processes and pressure 
(Hayek, 1976). The market is not a product of a human desire to create 
grand, strongly centralized and articulated systems, nor can the nature of 
markets be understood outside or beyond the act of exchange between 
two parties. Thus Hayek warns of the tendency to confuse the "market" 
with the "economy," the latter constituting a network of economic activ-
ity, which may include both market and non-market forms of production 
and distribution. An economy, rather than a market, may even imply a 
shared "hierarchy of ends" (p. 108), whereby government (non-market) 
and market mechanisms co-exist to bring about certain social, economic 
or political ends perceived as outside the capability of a f ree market. 
Therefore, an economy is, simply, an aggregate of all market and non-
market activity. 
Indeed, to marke t economists , the meri ts of markets and market 
economies can only be understood on this micro exchange level. Thus, 
given the centrality of the individual and the exchange which takes place 
between individuals in the absence of coersion, market-based economies 
are considered by their most enthusiastic proponents as necessary condi-
tions to the creation and preservation of the freedom and liberty of a 
given society's individual members, applicable to both the political and 
social arenas (Shipman, 1999, p. 13). According to Hayek (1976), "[it] is 
often made a reproach to the Great Society and its market order that it 
lacks an agreed ranking of ends. This, however, is in fact its great merit 
which makes individual freedom and all its values possible" (p. 109). 
Hayek states: 
Although there is good reason for preferring limited democra-
tic government to a non-democrat ic one, I must confess to 
p r e f e r r i n g n o n - d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t unde r the law to 
unlimited (and therefore essentially lawless) democratic gov-
ernment. Government under the law seems to be the higher 
value (Hayek in Marginson, 1993, p. 61). 
A market is a loose network composed of unorganized individuals 
able to access the in format ion necessary to make rat ional choices . 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXII, No. 2, 2002 
84 S.J. Young 
Competition - the "confrontation between agencies endowed with calcu-
lating tools of differing levels of eff iciency" (Callon, 1997, p. 32) — is 
its primary "discovery procedure," the essential way in which quality 
and value are assessed and made apparent. Of the various information 
cues available to the economic actor, price is a critical one, acting as 
"information in coded form," important given the varying wealth capaci-
ties and buying power of individual consumers (quoted in Haworth, 
1994, p. 117). 
Efficiency — even the improvement in the 'relative position 
of those in the lowest income groups ' resulting from the 'gen-
eral growth of wealth ' — is facilitated by the fact that prices 
indicate 'which of the available technical methods is most 
economical in the given circumstances. ' 
EMERGING MARKETS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
Having briefly revisited what constitutes markets and market rela-
tions, we are reminded of the requisite degree of care and qualification in 
applying the notions to the realm of higher education systems. N o doubt 
economists would denounce the use of the concept in relation to higher 
education altogether. The existence of portable subsidies, the lack of a 
clear relationship between price and cost, and the exertion of state control 
in nearly all systems of higher education, preclude the operation of mar-
kets, perfect or otherwise. It remains, however, of some use. Its utility lies 
in part in a sort of extension or re-evaluation of Clark's (1983) triangle of 
co-ordination, a concept which recognizes that there are in almost every 
system three forces that serve to shape all systems of higher education: 
(1) the forces of the market; (2) the forces of academic control, or the 
'academic oligarchy'; and, (3) the role played by the state in regulating 
and controlling systems. This combination of forces at play speak to the 
relative influences of one over the other in different systems, or in the 
same system over time. Thus this triangle can be used as a way of consid-
er ing shi f ts in the relative strength of one organizing principle over 
another. And though Clark wrote of private and not of public markets, the 
t r iangle can be considered an instrument in recognizing the ways in 
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which the dominance of the state gives way — in large or small part — to 
the dominance of market forces, or that the power of academics is dimin-
ished at the expense of that of a combination of market and state influence. 
Before beginning an examination of how the notion of markets and 
marketization have been conceived, shaped and reshaped in the educa-
tion finance literature, I will note some of the arguments made that must 
qualify the application of the concept of the market in the context of 
higher education, and whether or not the concept can be applied at all. 
An attempt will also be offered to explain how marketization accounts 
for a variety of changes in the public sector, which make it a more 
appropriate analytical f ramework for understanding university policy 
change in the context of Ontario. 
MARKETIZED COMPARED TO WHAT? 
RELATIVE MARKET FORCES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
A fair degree of consensus exists that there is no such thing as a per-
fect market in higher education (Breneman, 1981; Dill 1997a, 1997b). 
Equally strong arguments suggest that the operation and utilization of mar-
ket principles is fairly weak, as Breneman (1981) argues below: 
• That institutions (as "f i rms") are not motivated by profit, but 
rather by maximizing the indices of status and prestige. 
• That price fai ls as a reliable signal of either the product ' s 
quality or actual cost. 
• That evidence suggests quite strongly that the student-con-
sumer operates in a 'market ' in which there is largely insuffi-
cient informat ion regarding the range of products and the 
implications of purchasing one product over another, and that 
a student 's capacity to correct an error in purchase is weak. 
• That the range of subsidies that are offered public institu-
tions in contrast to private f i rms remove the possibility that 
comparisons can be made for "comparable services" in the 
two sectors, (p. 25) 
Of course, a perfect market does not exist even in the private sector, 
but rather only in the abstract. Thus, if the achievement of a perfect 
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market is difficult in the case of the market in guns, or the market in but-
ter, it is even more the case with higher education. In most countries, 
higher education is recognized as both a public and a private good, and 
thus financing arrangements reflect this insofar as both public moneys 
and private moneys are used to fund the sector. Subsidies in some form 
or another — including federal government and other sources of funding 
for research; regional, state or federal subsidies channelled directly to 
students in the form of portable grants, loans and other forms of student 
aid; or tax payer support for operating grants — are near universal in 
some measure. So what is meant by marketization in higher education? 
A c c o r d i n g to the Organ i sa t ion for E c o n o m i c Co-opera t ion and 
Development, member countries are either adopting or contemplating: 
(1) the adoption of more sophisticated formulae for allocating funds for 
teaching and research; (2) developing separate mechanisms for funding 
teaching and research; (3) increasing the role student fees play in financ-
ing the system; and, (4) implementing more competitively based 'bid-
ding ' schemes for public funds (OECD, 1990, p. 79). These policies 
serve to require inst i tut ions to engage in "compet i t ion for moneys , 
whether these are for external grants and contracts, endowment funds, 
university-industry partnerships, institutional investment in professors ' 
spin-off companies, or student tuition and fees" (Slaughter & Leslie, 
1997, p. 11). A longer list of indices of market-like behaviour includes 
the sale of educational services and products, and substantive institu-
tional reorganization, including administrative, that better supports the 
successful procurement of competitively allocated funds, both external 
and internal in source {passim). 
In their work, Academic Capitalism, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) take 
up the question of institutions' increasingly entrepreneurial behaviour. 
The choice of titles for their work was informed by human capital theory, 
in which faculty as highly skilled labour constitute one of the three fac-
tors of product ion, and as such contr ibute to economic growth. It is 
through this lens that they view what they see as the increasingly entre-
preneurial activity of faculty members themselves, as they progressively 
harness the resources and administrative apparatuses of universities to 
market their wares, work with spin-off companies and their marketing 
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arms, and draw on the same offices to compete for and obtain funds from 
both public and private sources, internal and external. "Their [faculty] 
scarce and specialized knowledge and skills are being applied to produc-
tive work that yields a benefit to the individual academic, to the public 
university they serve, to the corporations with which they work, and to 
the larger society" (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997, p. 11). 
The process of globalization provides the backdrop to the changes in 
university finance that are described and documented by Slaughter and 
Leslie. The combination of the opening of global financial markets, the 
rise of supra-national trade protocols and governance bodies, combined 
with the relat ive decl ine of the nation state means that pressures to 
reduce social spending in one nation become pressures of similar magni-
tude in a trading partner. This higher education reform, argue Slaughter 
and Leslie, is a consequence of the expansion of world markets, and has 
led to the creation of tighter linkages between universities and the mar-
ketplace in terms of an emphasis on science and technology research 
with commercial applications, as well as increasing the production of 
graduates in fields that enjoy a proximity to the market. Set against these 
global trends and pressures is the status of the unconditional block grant, 
reduced in part as a response to these pressures. Slaughter and Leslie 
argue that the relative decline in the block grant — which constituted a 
large and important source of universities' operating income — creates a 
destablized environment for universities, resulting in resource dependen-
cies. According to resource dependence theory, external agents that pro-
vide the bulk of funds to an institution wield substantial control, thus 
internal members of an organization are dependent upon those of exter-
nal agents (Pfef fer as cited in Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). Institutions 
such as universities interact with and depend on the external agents who 
cont ro l the d is t r ibu t ion of the r e sources on which the un ivers i t i es 
depend. Internal agents of a dependant organization expend considerable 
amounts of time, energy and resources strategizing as to how best to 
o b t a i n t h e r e s o u r c e s he ld a n d d i s t r i b u t e d by e x t e r n a l a g e n t s . 
"Negotiating exchanges to ensure the continuation of needed resources 
is the focus of much organizational action" (Pfeffer as cited in Slaughter 
& Leslie, 1997, p. 258). Thus, a reduction in the form of U.S. federal 
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funding for postsecondary education, from a shift in the relative empha-
sis on the block grant to a user subsidy such as student aid, would 
require institutions to shift their energies to make up for that lost income: 
Universities seek to capture alternative revenues. But substi-
tutes often carry stipulations; they require the performance of 
certain tasks. Collectively and individually, faculty perceive 
their greatest potential source of additional revenues to be in 
grants and contracts with government and with the private 
sector. Taking government block grants (as well as tuition fee 
revenues) as a given, they focus any marginal (additional) 
efforts on proposal writing, patenting, and developing and 
maintaining relations with potential funders. (Slaughter & 
Leslie, 1997, p. 71, italics in original) 
The centrality of the notion of competition, implied in the scramble 
to make up for lost funds from black grant reductions, is also empha-
sized in the work of Dill (1997a, 1997b). Universities, he argues, now 
operate in numerous markets, for professors, students and research 
funds. Add to this the delegation of authority to institutions themselves 
accompanied by greater accountability controls on the use of funds (Dill 
& Sporn, 1995, p. 3). In contrast to Slaughter and Leslie's emphasis on 
the development and process of marketization, with the importance they 
place on resource dependency theory and the "domino effect" of shifts in 
resource dependence, Dill focuses on the attraction of the perfectly com-
petitive market as a guide to reforms within higher education, particu-
larly in the U.S., in an effort to achieve more efficient and equitable 
allocation of higher education. 
Dill (1997b) provides four examples of public policy trends in 
global higher education financing patterns that exhibit a reliance on, and 
derive theoretical coherence f rom, the logic of markets. The first, 
encouraged by the economists of such global organizations such as the 
World Bank and UNESCO, is the trend toward "leveling the playing 
field" between private and public institutions through the deregulation of 
the public sector, and directing increasing subsidies to the systems' 
users. The theory behind such a move is that in so doing, developing 
countries can more easily shift from an elite to a mass system, in the face 
of severe limitations on public spending. 
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Dill 's second example of marketization or 'strain' is the creation of 
"quasi" markets in higher education, as in Britain, in which essentially 
the principles of competition are imported into public-funding allocation 
models. The third, and one increasingly a reality in both North American 
and European systems, is the requirement of institutions that they release 
greater amounts of information to the student-consumer, and develop 
mechanisms for achieving greater accountability for how these institu-
tions use their funds. And lastly, the tendency, also a global phenome-
non, that universi t ies increase user fees in public systems, decrease 
institutional operating support and increase the funds available for stu-
dent aid programs (Dill, 1997b). 
Like Slaughter and Leslie, Dill argues that universities and the gov-
ernments that fund and regulate them are under increasing pressure to 
change the way public investments are made. To improve efficiency and 
make institutions more adaptable to the changing expectations of the 
global economy, importing market mechanisms are viewed as a superior 
means to achieving these changes than were more tradit ional ways . 
Higher education reform that exploits the tools of the market is in part a 
response to perceived government fai lure to rationally or eff ic ient ly 
determine supply, demand or the distribution of educational resources, 
and is achieved through the relaxation of regulatory regimes and the 
devolution of responsibilities to institutions themselves. 
However, consistent with Dill 's emphasis on viewing government as 
a less than silent partner in the process of creating and stimulating mar-
kets, he asserts that relaxing regulation in one area may create increased 
government control, or at the very least greater involvement, in another 
area. For example, in the process of delegating discretion to the institu-
t ion fo r f i n a n c e s or f ee levels may a lso b r ing add i t iona l ru les fo r 
account ing for the ways in which funds are used, as is the case, he 
asser ts , in the U.S. and the U.K. A fur ther example is provided by 
Ontario. In that province, universities have been granted greater freedom 
to set tuition fees in certain areas in exchange for directing a portion of 
fee increases to institutional student aid programs. 
An important means of how governments control, interact with, and 
shape markets is through regulation. Regulatory measures exist in higher 
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education largely to control the behaviour of sellers in the market, and 
are concerned largely with the prices of various services provided by 
institutions. One of the major forms of regulation concerns tuition fees, 
and has been used by various governments to control the forces of sup-
ply and demand for undergradua te educa t ion . Gove rnmen t s do this 
through a variety of means, including tying the fee increase permitted to 
the operating grant, so that tuition fee increases over a certain govern-
ment mandated level results in a reduction in the operating grant (they 
may, of course, also simply set the fee). Other potential means of penal-
izing institutions is to deny their students access to student assistance 
programs or limit the funding of a number of spaces in such high-cost 
programs as medicine or dentistry (Dill, 1997b). 
Comparing Slaughter and Leslie's conceptions of markets in higher 
education produces no excessive degree of conflict and tension, but rather 
a markedly different emphasis . Dil l ' s investigation of the manner in 
which governments participate in the shaping, creation and stimulating of 
market forces admits of a greater recognition of the important role gov-
ernments play in higher education markets. Governments continue to 
have a stake in the contribution of universities to national and regional 
economies. As Dill and Sporn (1995) argue, "major universities, which in 
all countries, even in the United States, are increasingly seen by their 
governments as being among the remaining few and strategically most 
important state enterprises" (p. 1 ). In this respect then, the idea of markets 
provides a framework for change in the redesign and reconstruction of 
university finance policies. It is, however, in most jurisdictions the state 
that draws the blueprints of change and remains the architect of change. 
In Slaughter and Lesl ie (1997) and Leslie and Johnson (1972) , 
marketization is a domino effect that begins with the initial reduction 
in the block grant and the subsequent institutional attempts to make up 
for lost funds. Their treatment of the process suffers to some extent of 
reductionism, in which institutional actors shift energies in the face of 
declines in block grants and governments are relegated to the back seat 
in steering the direction of universit ies. In contrast , Dil l ' s approach 
a l lows three d imens ions of marke t iza t ion that are not permi t ted in 
Slaughter and Leslie 's work. 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXII, No. 2, 2002 
The Use of Market Mechanisms in Higher Education 91 
Finance and State Control 
1. That the market and the logic of perfectly competitive mar-
kets functions as an ideological construct, a political option 
that in the last twenty years, and in particular since the fall of 
the Soviet Union, is enjoying a renaissance, even within the 
context of the public sector. 
2. That an emphasis on the partnership between governments 
and markets allows for the myriad ways in which the creation 
of markets does not necessarily entail a more distanced rela-
tionship between the state and higher education institutions. 
3. That this notion of marketization that recognizes its facets, 
degrees and cont inued re la t ionship with the state is pre-
cisely what makes this a fundamenta l ly different experience 
than privatization. 
The dominance of the market as the organiz ing principle of the 
world economy today (Haworth, 1994; Kuttner, 1997; Shipman, 1999) 
serves to make its political dimensions virtually invisible. However, its 
ideological dimensions, the market as an ideological expression, must be 
recognized , and is ev iden t in the hopes which are hung on marke t 
economies on the part of its most virulent proponents. In other words, 
the market is a panacea for a host of unpleasantries, ranging from totali-
tarianism and communism (à la Friedman, 1945; Hayek, 1976) to the 
under investment in professional education (Friedman, 1945) to govern-
ment deficits and debt (Meek 1997). It is spoken of lovingly in grandly 
therapeutic ways. It is regarded by some as the most superior moral, eco-
nomic and philosophical order. Harness ing the market ( including its 
cousin, privatization) for the purposes of ordering higher education "is 
advanced as a kind of medicinal compound which is most efficacious in 
every case" (Rae, 1997, p. 60). To others, however, "in the post modern 
financial jungle, ' the market is a predator. It looks around for a vulnera-
ble currency and strikes it, unmerciful ly , like a c o b r a ' " (in Kenway, 
Bigum , & Fitzclarence, 1993, p. 120). This ideological dimension and 
its use by the state are both facets of marketization that are downplayed 
in the work of Slaughter and Leslie (1997), but are nonetheless impor-
tant in understanding its many nuances. 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXII, No. 2, 2002 
92 S.J. Young 
RECENT ONTARIO HIGHER EDUCATION 
FINANCE POLICIES CONSIDERED 
Ontario perhaps provides one of the best examples of how the twin 
strategies of state control and the use of market mechanisms converge, 
apparent in an examination of recent policy changes in that province. 
Beginning in 1995, with the election of the Progressive Conservatives, 
the Tory government proceeded to reorganize local government, consoli-
date control over elementary and secondary school and delegate other 
social services to local government, in addition to cutting social spend-
ing and corporate and personal income taxes. These policy shifts are 
occurring amidst a process whereby Ontario is undergoing a process of 
transformation " f rom heartland to region state" (Courchene & Telmer, 
1998). This process entails a number of policy and fiscal changes, both 
internal and external, that have recast the province 's previous role as 
most privileged province in the Canadian federation to a more self-inter-
ested, semi-independent nation-state. The provincial Tories have turned 
their a t tent ion in d i f f e ren t d i rec t ions — both inward and ou tward : 
inward of terms of crafting social and industrial policy as if it were an 
independent state, and outward in the sense that many of its policies are 
intended to increase its own position of competitiveness in the global, as 
opposed to the Canadian, economy. 
Assoc ia ted with this key thrust is a sh i f t toward marke t s 
(downsizing, privatizing, deregulation) and towards enterprise 
at both the business and individual level. The broad catalysts 
for all of this were two-fold — at the internal level, a reaction 
to the deemed excesses on the debt/deficit, tax and redistribu-
tional fronts triggered by the Peterson/Rae eras, and, that the 
external level, a buying into the implications and irreversibili-
ties ushered in by globalization and the knowledge/informa-
tion revolution (Courchene & Telmer, 1998, p. 213-214) . 
In their insightful study of Ontario's reorientation of Ontario as city-
or nation-state, the the authors further note that though spending cuts 
have in part reduced the overall size of government, the province has 
assumed a strong interest in the design features of a number of policies 
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of which the federa l gove rnmen t has previously been the exclusive 
architect, such as the Canada Pension Plan and Employment Insurance 
and training. They argue that the trends they have identified are due to a 
combination of forces, and their description of those trends is entirely 
consistent with what Cameron and Stein (2000) term the movement of 
political control "up, down and away from the nation state" (p. S16). 
Against this backdrop, the Ontario government have pursued poli-
cies in university finance which deem any stakeholder attempts to appeal 
to 'national averages ' a wasted effort. Change, and ' revolution' of the 
common sense variety in the direction of greater competit iveness was 
their first order of business. The principles of competition, partial dereg-
ulation and creating greater synergy between universities and the private 
sector are embodied in the following seven policy highlights: 
1. Changes in tuition fee policy and regulation: While the gov-
ernment permitted the basic arts and science fee to increase at 
the discretion of the universities to 133% of the formula fee, 
graduate programs in all areas were deregulated, as well as 
programs in engineering, law, medicine, dentistry, manage-
ment, education (the M.Ed, and Ed.D. streams), and all other 
programs deemed 'professional , ' including museum studies 
and the master 's program in public health; 
2. Changes in provincial allocations direct to the universities, 
and the increasing importance of other sources of income; 
3. Information dissemination requirements, based on the assump-
tion that markets are more 'perfect ' when greater amounts of 
information are accessible that may inform consumer choice. 
In related policy, a small portion of grants (about 2%) are tied 
to the institution's ability to remain below certain levels in 
terms of the student loan default rates. There are three indica-
tors: default, graduation and employment rates; 
4. The Ontario Student Opportunit ies Trust Fund, intended to 
increase the amount of s tudent support f u n d s avai lable to 
needy students. It was also a matching program in which the 
government of Ontario matched all funds raised in the private 
sector for student aid; 
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5. The Access to Opportunity Program, an initiative to 'double 
the pipeline' of computer science and engineering graduates. 
This program was conceived of by an IT sector lobby group, 
which put forward a proposal that the government match all 
funds raised by the private sector toward expanding the num-
ber of student spaces in these fields; 
6. The Ontario Research and Development Challenge Fund, in 
which the provincial government would contribute one-third 
of total funds required to support research initiatives that have 
secured private sector financing; 
7. New law and policy that enable the establishment and approval 
of new private, degree-granting institutions and programs. 
Considered together, these policies derive considerable coherence 
from the idea of the market: the effort to bring cost and price in the form 
of tuition into greater alignment; the information dissemination require-
ments; the encouragement of new, private degree-granting institutions; 
encouraging more synergy between the market and universities' research 
enterprise through the mechanism of matching-fund programs. However, 
two policies in particular illustrate the concerns of the government that it 
not forfeit control over universities' spending and investment priorities, 
and further, how it may combine the use of market mechanisms as addi-
tional levers to enhance government control. 
First, the Ontario Student Opportunity Trust Funds. The OSOTF ini-
tiative was announced in the budget speech in May of 1996 by the minis-
ter of finance. Each dollar raised by the colleges and universities within a 
specif ied t ime period would qual i fy for matching funds f rom the 
province. The government's stated purpose for mounting this program 
was to encourage private sector investments, from companies and indi-
viduals, to "invest in support for academically qualified individuals who 
for financial reasons would not otherwise be able to attend college or uni-
versity" (Guidelines for Ontario Student Opportunity Trust Funds, 
August 1996). When the program was announced, $100 million was set 
aside for distribution to the provinces and colleges, however at the end of 
the allotted time period, universities had managed to raise approximately 
$266 million (of that amount the University of Toronto garnered $114 
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million) and the community colleges approximately $47 million. Since 
there was no bidding process, no sector shares worked out, this meant one 
university's (and college's) success had greater potential to translate into 
another one 's failure. 
The manner in which the market allocated funds for student aid is 
noteworthy, which is represented in Table 1. Table 1 is a comparison of 
the percentage of funds raised by each institution, their share of provin-
cial enrolment, and the institution's percentage of OSAP-dependant stu-
dents. The amounts raised by four universities mirror very closely their 
share of provincial enrolment (Laurentian, Nipissing, Trent and York). 
Six universities out of 18 surpassed their share, though in four cases it 
w a s by e x t r e m e l y m a r g i n a l a m o u n t s ( G u e l p h , Hears t , M c M a s t e r , 
Queen's , York and Toronto). The University of Toronto raised roughly 
43% (or $95 million) of the total, while enrolling 17% of the province's 
university students. Queen 's University managed the second best result, 
raising almost 13% of total funds while enrolling only 5.7% of Ontario's 
university students. 
There are several potential rationales behind this program: offering 
this one-time only student aid program allowed the government to shift 
some of the costs away from the provincial loan program, since O S O T F 
f u n d s as wel l as o the r s t o t a l l i ng $ 6 0 0 and a b o v e w o u l d se rve to 
dec r ea se a s t u d e n t ' s loan en t i t l emen t . Howeve r , it can be seen to 
enhance the potency of the market insofar as it increased the resources 
of individual universities in competing for, and recruiting, students and 
their tuition revenue. 
The influence of the market is clearer in terms of its role in the allo-
cation of resources under the program: The government called upon the 
market to assist it in determining the distribution of public funds made 
available for the program. The government chose not to distribute funds 
on the basis of full-time enrolment, or use the funds to enrich OSAP, the 
province's loan program. Instead, it chose to 'contract out ' the task of 
allocating the funds to the donors who would fund the program. And 
finally, the program served to foster competition among universities for 
what is inarguably a finite amount of philanthropic dollars, and had the 
private sector determine institutional entitlement to tax-payer dollars. 
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Table 1 
Funds raised through the Ontario Student Opportunity Trust Funds Program 
Institution Dollars % of funds % Provincial %of 
Raised Enrolment OSOTF 
Brock 3,823,061 1.4 3.2 4.3 
Carleton 8,795,324 3.3 6.3 6.3 
Guelph 10,386,310 3.9 4.7 5.4 
Lakehead 3,251,601 1.2 2.6 2.1 
Laurentian 5,973,447 2.2 2.5 2.4 
McMaster 14,383,128 5.4 5.9 5.5 
Nipissing 1,714,621 0.6 0.8 1.2 
OCAD 250,895 0.1 0.7 1.0 
Ottawa 7,733,647 2.9 7.4 5.8 
Queen's 34,607,513 13.0 5.7 4.9 
Ryerson 2,817,497 1.1 6.0 5.8 
Toronto 114,234,007 42.9 17.0 16.2 
Trent 2,785,520 1.0 1.8 2.4 
Waterloo 3,237,891 1.2 6.5 7.0 
Western Ontario 18,328,278 6.9 9.5 9.7 
Wilfrid Laurier 2,271,182 0.9 2.6 3.3 
Windsor 2,802,632 1.1 4.6 4.6 
York 28,906,902 10.9 12.0 12.1 
266,303,456 100.00* 100.00* 100.00 
* Figures do not add due to rounding. 
Sources : " F u n d s ra ised th rough OSOTF, ' " Minis t ry of Educa t ion and Tra in ing ; 
Enrolment by Institution figures derived from COU, Compendium of Statistical and 
Financial Information, 2002. 
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The second program considered here is the Access to Opportunities 
Program. In its 1998 budget, the provincial government pledged $150 mil-
lion, later increased to $228 million, to universities and colleges in order to 
induce them to double the number of spaces in information technology 
(IT) programs (electrical and computer engineering and computer science) 
in Ontario colleges and universities. This one-time-only sum of $228 mil-
lion was designed to allow universities to expand their physical and build-
ing capacity required to accommodate the increase of precisely 100% in 
the number of spaces (and to a lesser extent faculty), for laboratory space, 
teaching facilities and faculty offices. Eligibility for the program required 
universities to submit relatively detailed financial and academic plans to 
the provincial government by November, 1998. In addition, there was a 
yet-to-be-determined amount of earmarked base budget funding available 
to hire and retain the new faculty required. The $228 million ATOP fund 
was allocated among universities using two main criteria: (1) a univer-
sity's share would be based on its share of IT programs enrolment, and 
(2) that universities successfully raise the equivalent of their matching dol-
lar share from the private sector before April 1999. 
This program was proposed by Ontario-based, Canadian IT compa-
nies to the province of Ontario in its match ing-fund form after the indus-
try's failure to influence federal immigration policy, in the direction of 
facilitating the entry of greater numbers of skilled foreign-born IT work-
ers. In February of 1998, CATA submitted to the provincial government 
a detailed plan to increase the number of undergraduate IT spots in 
Ontario universities, premised on provincial investment that would be 
used to leverage financial support from the lobby group's membership. 
In the proposal , the association est imated that Ontario would require 
more than 56,000 new IT workers by the year 2000, against the available 
pool of 14,000 — a shortfall of 42,000 (CATA, 1998). 
In order to stress the serious nature of the skills shortage, CATA 
issued a not-so-veiled threat. "Unfortunately, our members are telling us 
that there is now a strong likelihood that some, if not much, of this 
growth may be dest ined for of fshore . Whi le locat ions decis ions are 
always complex, the availability of highly trained knowledge workers is 
becoming the driving force for these matters" (CATA, 1998., p. iii). In 
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other words , if the government re fused to invest in high- technology 
training at some public expense, this IT sector would seek out other 
manufacturing centres which possessed more readily available pools of 
qualified technology workers. 
The government responded with an announcement to part icipate 
quickly. Indeed, the haste with which the government pursued this pro-
posal invited what could only be considered a rather dubious form of 
praise. In the words of the then-executive director of CATA: 
. . .normal ly such a program would be announced and then 
d i sappear for six to twelve mon ths whi le the bureaucra t s 
worked on the details. Our hat is off to the government and its 
officials for working in real time, and delivering the program 
in less than 30 days. Never before have we seen a government 
as responsive to the warp speed time frames needed to keep 
pace with the technology communi ty . This will a l low the 
postsecondaiy institutions to dramatically increase their enrol-
ments this fall. (CATA news release, May 1998) 
Unlike the OSOTF program, the initiative itself, that is, large scale 
expansion of the number of IT-training spots, came from the private sec-
tor and the community of potential funders. And though presumably pro-
gram funde r s would not have a say over what is taught in these IT 
programs, funders did in fact have a say over the design of the program 
insofar as the matching program was concerned. In this case, the govern-
ment in fact responded to a stated need among the private sector, and less 
the demand expressed by student-consumers, and adopted design parame-
ters for the program would preserve choice among potential funders in 
determining the distribution of resources that would fund the expansion. 
That there will never be sufficient ways or space qualifying the appli-
cation of the concept of the market in higher education, it is suggested 
here that the example of Ontario adds to our understanding of how mar-
ketization may be accompanied by enhanced state control. However, as 
Slaughter and Leslie (1997) point out in Academic Capitalism: 
Of course, the word capitalism connotes private ownership 
of the factors of the means of production - land, labour, cap-
ital - and considering employees of public universities to be 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXII, No. 2, 2002 
The Use of Market Mechanisms in Higher Education 99 
Finance and State Control 
capital is ts at f i rs t glance seems a blatant contradict ion. 
However, capitalism is also defined as an economic system in 
which allocative decisions are driven by market forces, (p. 9) 
CONCLUSION 
Ontario provides a case study in marketization that demonstrates its 
use as a conceptual tool in elucidating the ways in which governments 
employ market mechanisms to assist it in the allocation of resources 
without forfeiting complete control over university systems. Despite its 
overuse or excessively liberal application, the notion of marketization 
permits an understanding of recent university finance policy change in 
Ontario not afforded by the notion of privatization. With this understand-
ing, it is possible to see recent policy changes as embodying a compro-
mise between academic autonomy and the total forfeiture of the power 
of the state in an atmosphere of general distrust of government control 
over western socio-economic life. • 
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